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Article 3

BRAIN QUIRKS AND COURTROOM TESTIMONY
Abstract

Selected findings from the neurosciences addressing ways in which the brain processes information are
reviewed from the perspective: “Do the findings inform our understanding of courtroom testimony by
witnesses attempting to give accurate accounts of observed events?” Answers to the question include: accurate
recall is possible but difficult and infrequent; built-in and learned (possibly?) information processing systems
which disrupt memory and bias interpretations are responsible for this outcome; witnesses are seldom aware
of disruptions unless they are experiencing difficulty remembering.
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THE CONTEXT

The situation addressed here is this: an individual with a “normal” brain observes
an event such as a fender-bender, a fight, or a holdup and subsequently becomes a
witness in court where s/he attempts to recall the event as accurately as possible.
Not considered here is testimony by individuals with deranged minds, who
knowingly deceive, whose testimony is influenced by conflict of interest, or sex
differences in the ability to recall (studies indicate that males and females differ in
their ability to recall).

BACKGROUND

Perhaps the first point to emphasize is that using research findings from the
neurosciences to explain individual behavior is not necessarily easy or
straightforward. Difficulties arise in part because of the way in which most
neuroscience studies are conducted: data are developed using groups of individuals
(“experimental subjects”) and subjected to statistical analysis and presentation, a
process which often obscures individual differences among subjects. The state of
technical devices is also relevant. They often limit the kinds of questions that can
be asked and answered.

Memory provides a convenient example of the types of difficulties that can
develop. There is now evidence that both the biochemical and cellular systems
responsible for storing memories differ from those systems involved in
reconstituting memories (Lee et.al., 2004) – the hypothetical witness would be
reconstituting a memory. While these are interesting findings, their courtroom
implications are not immediately clear. For example, it is possible that a
reconstituted memory accurately describes what the witness observed and initially
recorded in memory. By analogy: when printing a photograph and then
reproducing it on a copying machine, very different scanning and chemical
processes are involved but the copy may be indistinguishable from the original
print.

But it is also possible that alterations occur in what was observed and initially
stored in memory. For example, findings from a number of studies suggest that
the brain often suppresses unwanted or unpleasant memories (Miller, 2004) -examples include observing events in which individuals are seriously injured or
severely frightened. Further, new memories, which tend to weaken during the day
but which can be strengthened by sleep must be reconstituted in order to persist
(Fenn, et.al., 2003; Walker et.al., 2003) – in effect, memories tend to fade unless
there is an active recall effort following sleep. And adrenal hormones associated
with stress are known to affect the left and right amygdalas, interior brain
structures that play a critical role in processing emotion-laden information (Bower,
2003). One’s level of stress, which may have nothing to do with what is observed,
also has a memory disrupting potential. Given these and related findings, at this
moment in time, the accuracy of reconstituted memories remains uncertain at best
and, at worst, accurate recall seems unlikely.
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There are obvious objections to this conclusion. Most of the time people can recall
the make of their car, the names of friends, and where the coffee is located. These
acts require accurate reconstituted memories. In most instances, these types of
memories differ from observing single, often brief, and unexpected events in that
they involve repeated memory reconstitution and are reinforced by learning (a
process similar to memorizing). Moreover, recall is assisted by the limited number
of possible recall options – e.g., the coffee is unlikely to be in the attic so the attic
need not be considered when trying to find the coffee. Nevertheless, one does
sometimes forget where the coffee is located or believe that it is located where it is
not.

BRAIN QUIRKS AND TESTIMONY

What are some of the brain’s information-processing quirks and their courtroom
implications? Some are obvious. Others less so. A non-obvious quirk is
discussed first.

Observed objects in short-term memory
Contrary to the rich phenomenology of our visual-auditory experiences, our visual
short-term memory system can maintain representations of only a few objects at a
time. Imagine a random list of numbers projected briefly on a screen. It’s easy
enough to remember two or three numbers, but when there are 8 or more only one
in a hundred individuals can recall them. Short-term memory is the first step in
transferring visual, auditory, and tactical information to storage in long-term
memory (memories that can be recalled at a later time).
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Individuals can store from 1.5 to 5 objects in short-term memory and for most
individuals the number remains highly consistent across a variety of research
protocols (Vogel and Machizawa, 2004). Studies leading to these findings
typically use electrophysiological monitoring. The electrical activity of subjects’
brains is monitored while subjects are briefly shown arrays of objects and asked to
recall what they have seen. The amplitude of electrophysiological response
predicts the number of objects that individuals can recall. (To illustrate short-term
memory at work, close your eyes and set the pause button on an unfamiliar VHS or
DVD movie. Look at the scene on the screen by quickly opening and shutting
your eyes. Then list what you recall from the scene and compare the list with the
scene.)

What are the implications for courtroom testimony? First, witnesses will differ in
their capacities to accurately recall many of the details of rapidly occurring events
such as an automobile accident. Second, witnesses who provide excessive detail
about such events are likely to be combining memories and interpretation. Such
individuals may believe that their reconstituted memory accurately describes what
they observed – we tend to believe our memories more often than not. But the
likely explanation for the reported detail is that they have selected objects from
several separate short-term memories, organized and interpreted them, and
developed a story with excessive but not necessarily accurate detail. This is much
like what happens when viewing a motion picture where 32 still photographs are
presented each second which the brain then alters so that one experiences
continuity of movement and speech. Recalling all of what one observed in a single
frame is nearly impossible and, for most individuals, recalling the details of what
was observed over a three-four second period is also impossible. Third, it would
be possible to test a witness’s short-term memory capacity and compare it with
his/her testimony. For example, a witness who has the capacity to recall five
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objects in short-term memory should be able to provide more detailed information
about an event than a witness with less capacity. If witnesses report they can’t
recall an event, deception is a possibility, but memory disruptions due to stress,
lack of sleep, or memory suppression are possibilities.

Time changes during periods of excitement and boredom
This is perhaps an obvious quirk. Concentration on the passage of time, as often
happens when one is bored, triggers brain activity which results in the perception
that time is moving slowly. Conversely, when one is focused on an event which
one finds exciting, the opposite happens: one senses that time moves rapidly.
These two brain states can be differentiated using fMRI technology (BBC, 2004).
(Most neuroimagers mapping brain activity favor functional magnetic resonance
imaging [fMRI] over other imaging technologies such as Positron Emission
Tomography [PET] which expose subjects to radioactivity. fMRI technology is
free of radioactivity and it permits repeated monitoring of the same individual.)

There are several possible implications. One is that real time of an event on which
one is focused, such as a holdup or a fistfight, might take place over a longer
period than one recalls. On the other hand, if one is testifying about the time of an
event which was observed during a period of boredom – say, the length of time the
gardener spent mowing the next door neighbor’s lawn –, the times might be shorter
than one recalls.

Further, recall of the time of an event may vary. Because boredom often involves
clock watching, if an observed event is brief and the observer is bored, recalling
the time of the event is likely to be more accurate than if s/he were focused where
clock watching is less frequent. But there are other possibilities. For example,
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should it turn out that boredom is more stressful than focusing, recall among the
bored may be less accurate than among the non-bored.

The tangled web of event interpretation
Take the experiment in which two people see the same movie while being
monitored simultaneously using fMRI technology. Approximately 25-30%
similarity in the activity of specific brain areas is reported (Pessoa, 2004).
Similarity is highest when events in the movie are either unexpected or emotionladen, such as an unexpected suicide or a shooting. In effect, those sharing a
visual-auditory experience may see similar things and the initial routing and
processing of what is seen through the brain may be similar.

Cross-person similarity in fMRI signals does not extend to the prefrontal cortex,
however, that part of the brain in which critical information interpretation
functions are carried out. Interpretations are highly individualized and they often
involve the selection of different memories as well as unique memory
interpretation.

Two potentially interesting implications emerge from these findings. First, what a
person observes does not predict how s/he will interpret it. Here, personal history
and mood at the time of the observation are the likely influencing factors in
determining which objects are selected from short-term memory and how they are
interpreted. For example, say you arrive at an automobile accident and find that a
close friend of your daughter has been seriously injured. Because you know the
injured person (your personal history), your reaction will be different than if the
injured person is a stranger. Further, subsequent events may influence memory
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reconstitution. Thus, if the injured person dies and your daughter is adversely
affected, later recall is likely to undergo alterations.

Second, hearing conflicting testimony by two witnesses who observed the same
event may simply reflect normal differences in how individuals process
information.

Personality and happy faces
Using fMRI technology, if normal individuals are monitored while being shown
pictures of happy faces, there is minimal left or right amygdala activation.
However, if they are show pictures of fearful faces (non-threatening faces which
signal that a person is fearing some one or something), both the left and right
amygdalas show moderate activation (Canli, et.al., 2002). Amygdala activation is
a rough measure of the emotional response to information and degree of activation
influences what is stored in memory, its interpretation, and subsequent behavior.
Activation in response to fearful faces thus may reflect the importance the brain
gives to detecting potentially dangerous situations. Similar fMRI findings are
reported for responses to positive and negative words (Mamann and Mao, 2002).

Exceptions to these “normal” responses are found among extroverts (individuals
strongly interested in their social and/or physical environments). Compared to
non-extroverts who show minimal amygdala activation in response to pictures of
happy faces, extroverts show moderate left amygdala activation. The left
amygdala is associated with positive feelings toward others and social relating
behavior. Extroverts, however, show minimal amygdala activation to fearful faces
which among non-extroverts result in moderate left and right amygdala activation.
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The key implication here seems clear: personality type may influence how
individuals respond to social signals, the objects that are stored in short-term
memory, and their interpretation. In effect, personality types can be viewed as
information filtering and interpretation systems.

But wait, it doesn’t get simpler – another amygdala study.
Again, the experimental setting is that of using fMRI technology to monitor the
activity of the brain’s functional areas. If an angry face is directed at normal
subjects, there is moderate left and right amygdala activation. However, if an
angry face is averted (not looking at the subject) left and right amygdala activation
increases nearly three-fold. The opposite occurs with fearful faces: an averted
fearful face results in moderate left and right amygdala activation while a direct
fearful face leads to a two-fold increase in left and right amygdala activation
(Adams et.al., 2003).

What are the possible implications? First, physical location will influence how
witnesses respond to others’ fearful and angry faces. Consider a situation in
which potential witnesses circle a person who exhibits an angry face. Depending
on the location of the witnesses, different levels of amygdala activation are likely.
And because amygdala activation influences what is stored in memory and
interpreted, if each of the encircling individuals becomes a witness their accounts
of the event will differ.

Second, the brain appears to be especially sensitive to ambiguous information. In
averted and non-averted gaze studies described above, the ambiguous information
is the non-averted fearful face and the averted angry face. Said another way, the
brain appears to have built-in expectations about how others signal their mood
states. If the signals don’t map to the expectations (e.g., fearface directed at a
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subject rather than the source of the fear), the brain is alerted, one indication of
which is amygdala activation. Such responses are similar to those that occur with
unexpected changes in familiar physical environments, e.g., one may barely notice
the location of furniture in a familiar room unless it has been changed.

To add a footnote to the proceeding findings, there is evidence for what might be
termed “set point changes” in what the brain expects. This applies particularly to
faces (Webster et al, 2004) where repeated exposure to pictures of faces that are
systematically altered leads to changes in what subjects view as a “normal face.”
Applied to everyday experience, if one spends the morning at a nursery school
observing children and then has an unexpected encounter with a same-age friend,
the friend will look older than one recalls s/he looks. The opposite response would
occur when a same-age friend brings a baby into a group of adults: the friend
won’t look older but the baby will look younger than s/he is. Here, an implication
is that one’s experiences in the moments prior to observing an event may influence
perception and event interpretation.

The brain’s negative bias
Studies of the brain’s biases are straightforward and they demonstrate that the
brain has greater sensitivity to negative (unpleasant or undesired information) than
positive information. The usual measure of sensitivity is the brain’s
electrophysiological response to negative information (e.g., a picture of a mutilated
person) compared to positive (e.g., a Ferrari) and neutral information (e.g., a
plate). And, if they are recalled, unpleasant experiences are recalled for longer
periods than pleasant ones (Marano, 2003).

9

This is the glass half-full and half-empty story and there are good evolutionary
reasons for a negative bias – it may help keep one out of harm’s way. Thus, a
reasonable assumption about witnesses is that their reports of events that have both
positive and negative features will be biased toward the negative. Negative bias
may also be intensified among certain personality types in which case testimony
may deviate significantly when compared to persons with an average negative bias.

Compromise is the name of the brain’s game – the 7% principle
It turns out that the brain ignores small changes in the environment or the behavior
of others. Consider the situation in which you are driving on a freeway. If
carefully observed, everyone is driving a bit differently, some more to the right
than the left sides of their lanes, some weaving more than others, and so forth. The
brain tends to discount this variance unless it is excessive – a 7% change in
expected behavior is a way of saying the same thing.

Ways in which the brain disregards small changes can be demonstrated by asking
subjects to view a dot on a large screen (Tweed, 2003). The dot is then moved
various distances and subjects report if the dot has moved. Small moves are
usually invisible to subjects but all subjects recognize large moves. “The brain
takes in raw data from its surroundings through sensors and interprets it, rejecting
interpretations it consider unlikely” (Tweed, 2003, pg. 1). Inbuilt (innate/evolved)
and learned (possibly?) processes appear to be involved in such assessments and, if
learning is involved, it requires the refinement of interpretation algorithms that are
stable against slight changes in signals (Tomasi, 2004).

The 7% figure reflects findings from similar studies which show that many stimuli
need to undergo somewhere between a 5-8% change before change is recognized.
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Seven percent can also be looked at from an evolutionary perspective. Literally all
of the information we receive through our eyes and ears and other senses is
partially flawed because of the limitations of our sensory systems, and this may be
added to such factors as our angle of view, our personalities, our different past
experiences, etc. Thus it is not surprising that objects are sometimes misperceived,
that we misinterpret words, and that we sometimes mistake an unknown individual
for an old friend. The brain is stuck with trying to make sense out of flawed
information and it appears to do so in part by disregarding small changes from
what is expected. Thus, when driving, minor variations in others’ driving styles
usually go unnoticed. But when the driver ahead suddenly drifts out of his lane
onto the shoulder, the brain awakes.

Returning to courtroom testimony, assuming that witnesses will disregard minor
details of events should be the rule, not the exception.

Serotonin and social status
Although the brain is usually thought of as a separate organ, there is another way
to think about it, namely as a “social brain,” where its day-to-day functions are
inseparable from its social context and the social signals it receives. This view
makes sense intuitively. For example, receiving disconcerting news about a loved
one changes how one thinks, feels, and acts and it is the brain that is doing the
thinking, feeling, and initiating the acting in response to such information. An
informative example of the social brain concept is found among high-status male
vervet monkeys where brain serotonin levels (a neurochemical involved in
information transmission) and turnover rates significantly exceed those of lowerstatus monkeys. And when a monkey’s status changes, so do his brain serotonin
levels and turnover rates (Raleigh et.al., 1984,1991).
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A key implication of these findings is suggested by the responses of high- and lowstatus animals to memory, learning, and decision-making tasks. High-status
animals learn faster than lower-status animals. They recall things they have learned
longer. And they are more rapid and accurate decision makers. These findings
extrapolate to humans (Madsen, 1985, 1994). Thus, one’s social status may be
another factor influencing which objects are stored in short-term memory, the
content of long-term memory, and memory interpretation (Zizzo, 2002). Indirect
support for this view comes from studies showing that serotonin depletion of the
prefrontal cortex (an executive function area) decreases behavioral and cognitive
flexibility (Clarke et al, 2004).

Some final points
If one recalls that one’s car is at location X but after searching finds the car at
location Y, there is usually a moment of awareness about the fallibility of one’s
memory. But if the car is at location X, there is no such awareness. Most of us
live and work in familiar environments, that is environments in which we use
repeated memories the majority of which are accurate – the fax machine is where it
was yesterday and one’s dog has the same name day after day. In such
environments it is easy enough to assume that one’s memories are accurate. But if
one engages in a novel but unfamiliar task, say, constructing a garden shed, the
number of memory errors (e.g., believing tool Z is at location L only to find it at
location Q) noticeably increases.

There are also memories one deems worth remembering and those not worth
remembering. One may observe the license plate number of a car parked next to
one’s car in a parking lot but few people think it is worth remembering. Observing
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a holdup or living through a highly positive emotional event is another matter,
however. Most people would work at preserving the memory of these events in as
much detail as possible. Still, such memories are subject to considerable revision.
This occurs frequently when the memory of an emotion-laden event is shared with
others, who, through their comments and questions (“Are you sure it happened that
way?”) inadvertently influence revision.

DISCUSSION

It might seem that the preceding discussion would lead to only one conclusion:
reports by witnesses are inaccurate, biased, incomplete, conflated, etc. (a view,
although in a milder form, that is often privately voiced by lawyers with courtroom
experience). Even for the most straightforward recall situations, there are simply
too many possible memory-disrupting processes to suggest a more positive
conclusion. Yet as noted earlier, countering this conclusion is everyday experience
where we remember most important things most of the time. But it is also true that
people sometimes forget where they put their glasses, scheduled appointments, or
if they cashed checks, all seeming important things to remember.

As far as further neuroscience research is concerned, will it clarify things? There
will be progress. Yet, one should adopt a healthy skepticism about the
neurosciences providing definitive memory-clarifying insights in the near future.
Since the Enlightment there have been serious efforts to connect the findings of
science with the richness of human experience. Science has generally called for
unifying theories that would make the world simple. Every day experience has had
an opposite calling with its emphasis on the richness and complexity of human
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experience. Findings from the neurosciences do little to provide insights into the
characters of Proust, Dickens, Musil, or Steinbeck. So, connection, if it is to
occur, will likely require modifications in scientific concepts, methodologies, and
questions because our rich and complex perceptions are unlikely to change.1
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Footnote

1. On the lighter side, there may be help on the way for those who frequently
forget such things are their car keys and glasses. A Canadian group has come up
with the idea of labeling items people normally take with them (e.g., car keys) with
radio frequency identification tags (RFID) which are small electronic labels used
to automate commercial goods tracking. A specially designed watch sends a beep
when the items are outside three meters. Unfortunately, the watch doesn’t tell you
where you might have left your glasses. (New Scientist, August 14, 2004).
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